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Expanding Carbon Markets through 
New Market-based Mechanisms 
A synthesis of discussions and submissions 
to the UNFCCC 
Andrei Marcu* 
1.  Introduction 
At the Durban meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
Parties to the Convention and observer organisations were invited to make submissions on a number 
of issues relevant to the discussions on various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, 
to enhance the cost-effectiveness of mitigation actions. This report reviews the submissions by Parties 
and observer organisations, in response to the request for submissions.
1  
Based on the work of the Carbon Market Forum (CMF) at the CEPS, this report is intended as a 
synthesis of most of the submissions received so far, also taking into account the common threads and 
understanding emerging from the Durban negotiations and post-Durban discussions.  
The CEPS CMF would like to  facilitate progress in the expansion of a global carbon market, and 
regards the negotiations under the UNFCCC as an important venue for the continued development of 
new market mechanisms (NMMs) as well as a framework for new approaches. 
In this context, this report aims at contributing to the European debate on the development of new 
market mechanisms and carbon markets, as well as to the UNFCCC negotiating process.  
It attempts to identify some of the main issues that will need to be addressed during this year, leading 
to the 18
th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Doha, and discusses the various options proposed. It 
does not, as a first output of the CMF on this issue and given the state of negotiations under the 
UNFCCC, propose solutions. 
We hope it serves as a useful reference document for negotiators. 
2.  Background 
The Kyoto Protocol provides for three flexibility mechanisms: the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), joint implementation (JI) and emissions trading.  
As they have become operational, together with the EU-based cap-and-trade system (EU Emissions 
Trading System), they have formed the core of a nascent carbon market. This market has grown from 
nothing to a market of over €100 billion a year, and is one of the substantive and concrete successes of 
the Rio Conventions. Putting a value on a tonne of carbon has changed the way society looks at 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Meanwhile,  as  negotiations  on  a  new  agreement  started,  discussions  were  accompanied  by  the 
recognition that there was a new level of ambition as well as a different architecture for the new 
agreement.  
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At the same time, significant experience was gathered through the operation of the CDM and JI, which 
led to the discovery of shortcomings in their operation and limitations in their basic design. This, 
together with the rapid emergence of mechanisms outside the framework of the UNFCCC, and the 
beginning of the process for the development of a new climate regime, led many to conclude that 
consideration of new market mechanisms was a real necessity. 
The  Bali  Road  Map  under  paragraph  1(b)(v)  includes  the  development  of  “various  approaches, 
including  opportunities  for  using  markets,  to  enhance  the  cost-effectiveness  of,  and  to  promote, 
mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing countries”.
2 
While negotiations of the Bali Road Map have been complex and slow, negotiations of 1(b)(v)have 
been particularly difficult. For many sessions, no progress could be achieved, with no material being 
transmitted from one session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG 
LCA) to another.  
After the failure of the Copenhagen COP in 2009, however, it became increasingly clear that the 
credibility  of  the  multilateral  system  was  at  stake,  and  that  progress  had  to  be  achieved  in  the 
UNFCCC context. It also became abundantly clear that there were strong positions on the use of 
markets, but that any overall package could only emerge as a compromise if it included provisions for 
new market mechanisms. 
Movement was achieved at the UNFCCC meeting in Panama in October 2011, where a text was 
forwarded for discussion at COP 17 in Durban. This text was the result of essentially four different 
groups of positions.  
An  understanding  of  these  pre-Durban  positions  is  needed  to  recognise  what  has  emerged  from 
Durban and from the submissions for the 5 March deadline required by the Durban AWG LCA text, as 
well as future negotiating stances. 
The  positions  described  below  could  be  construed as  moving  on  a  continuum,  from  new  market 
mechanisms that exhibit 
  A  lower  level  of  flexibility  and  national  discovery,  increased  complexity  in  operation,  and 
strong certainty in environmental outcomes,  
to 
  a higher level of flexibility, allowing new ideas to emerge at the national level, combined with 
more complexity in coordination and accounting, as well as the increased need for international 
supervision  in  evaluating  systems/new  market  approaches  and  making  the  information 
transparent.  
1)  No new market mechanisms. Some Parties took the position that 
  markets do not work in general; 
  existing market mechanisms, both CDM and JI, have not performed well, in that the reductions 
were by and large not additional; 
  the need for new market mechanisms was conditional upon a second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol; and 
  the targets were not ambitious enough to warrant a discussion and potential development of new 
market mechanisms. 
This position has resulted for more than two years in a largely sterile discussion about whether we 
want to discuss new market mechanisms. 
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It must be emphasised that the discussions in the context of negotiations did not allow for any serious 
or substantive input by Parties to articulate their proposals in any depth.  
As such, upon arrival in Durban, positions were more sketched out than developed and explained in 
detail. This resulted in difficulties at the Durban negotiations with issues of substance, but also with 
issues concerning the terminology used. As discussed below, this continues to be one of the issues 
emerging from the 5 March submissions. 
2)  Development of a new market mechanism. Some Parties promoted the vision of a mechanism that 
would 
  have a crediting and trading component; 
  cover broad sectors of the economy; 
  be defined globally, but with flexibility to allow for the recognition of local circumstances (the 
80/20 rule); and 
  ensure strong environmental credibility. 
This has become known as the ‘sectoral mechanism’, but with features that make it clear that it is very 
different from the initial discussion about transnational sectoral approaches earlier in the negotiating 
process, which sought to ensure cross-border sectoral commitments. 
3)  Define a framework. This approach, supported by some Parties, promoted a vision in which 
  new mechanisms can be designed and proposed top-down and bottom-up; 
  top-down mechanisms would be designed and approved by the COP; 
  nationally defined mechanisms would need to be examined and approved by the COP or a COP-
mandated regulatory body, according to a set of international standards; 
  local flexibility, innovation and local circumstances can be taken into account; 
  potential filtering by ‘buyers’ of units is included; and  
  strong regulatory oversight is needed to ensure ‘a tonne is a tonne’. 
4)  High level of flexibility. This approach promoted a vision in which 
  Parties could introduce new mechanisms; 
  these mechanisms would be recorded and acknowledged; 
  Parties,  based  on  their  declaration,  would  have  a  strong  reputational  incentive  to  maintain 
environmental integrity; and 
  there would be no ‘oversight’, approval process or UNFCCC-level enforcement powers.  
3.  Durban decisions 
In Durban, a number of agreements were reached. For the first time, under a provision included in the 
Durban text under the AWG LCA, it was agreed that a market mechanism would be created in the 
UNFCCC context, under paragraph 83, which “defines a new market mechanism operating under the 
guidance and authority of the COP”.
3  
This is the top-down element of the new market mechanism, which almost all Parties accept can go 
ahead and be defined under the auspices of the UN. Units resulting from this new mechanism, which 
is expected to take a sectoral form, were understood to qualify for compliance under the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and any future UNFCCC obligations. This is reflected in 
provisions in the decision text of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I 
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Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG KP) from Durban. 
There is also a bottom-up element in the AWG LCA text regarding the creation of new mechanisms. 
The  text  notes  in  the  preamble  that  “Parties  may…develop  and  implement  such  approaches  in 
accordance with national circumstances”. 
Paragraph  79  also  speaks  of  “various  approaches,  including  the  opportunity  for  using 
markets…[which] must meet standards that deliver real, permanent, additional and verified emissions 
reductions”.  Paragraph  80  refers  to  a  “work  programme  to  consider  a  framework  for  such 
approaches”. 
In its provisions for a bottom-up approach, the AWG LCA text from Durban is very imprecise, as 
some options were unacceptable, a ‘red line’, for some Parties, and as a compromise needed to be 
reached, this led to language that had to be ambiguous. 
Still, it must be emphasised that this is a fundamental matter for the new market mechanism, as well as 
the development and evolution of the GHG market post-2012, as discussed below. 
In the course of the Durban discussions one issue was whether mechanisms emerging bottom-up from 
Parties needed a set of centrally defined ‘core elements’ or standards that all new approaches aimed at 
producing units traded internationally and used for compliance with obligations under the UNFCCC 
would have to observe.  
The second issue was squarely whether newly created mechanisms needed to have central oversight to 
ensure that the core elements/standards referred to in paragraph 79 are adhered to, and what role, if 
any, the UN would play in such oversight. 
This matter is fundamental, as it will affect (at least at the beginning), the fungibility of units and 
market liquidity. There was clear discomfort among some Parties at the prospect of subjecting their 
national or bilateral agreements (or both) to external oversight.  
At the other end of the spectrum were Parties clearly taking the stance that a strong central body was 
needed for this role. Yet others felt that a transition period would be required, in which loose or no 
oversight was required as an intermediary step in an evolutionary process. 
It is important to recognise that many Parties, both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1, have proposals for new 
mechanisms that would need to be accommodated, and visible lack of progress on the definition of the 
framework would signal the lack of an avenue for the implementation of their own approaches. 
At  the  same  time,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Durban  AWG  KP  text,  units  from  new  market 
mechanisms under the Convention will qualify for compliance during the second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol. There were significant efforts in Durban to tie this provision to solving the 
issue of carrying over assigned amount units from the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
In this regard, there were restrictive proposals from the ALBA group (Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, 
Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela) as well as an 
African proposal, either banning all carry-over or severely limiting the use of carry-over units in future 
years. 
4.  Submissions on the new market mechanism and framework 
The  submissions  considered  in  this  report  are  discussed  under  the  NMM  and  the  framework,  as 
outlined below. 
4.1  Issues related to the new market mechanism 
The creation of a new market mechanism was clearly a red line for a number of Parties – no NMM, no 
Durban deal. To start with, we need to summarise what the Cancun and Durban texts give us. An 
outline of the vision is in paragraph 83 of the AWG LCA Durban text, which  
[d]efines a new market-based mechanism, operating under the guidance and authority of the 
Conference of  the Parties, to  enhance  the  cost-effectiveness  of,  and  to  promote, mitigation EXPANDING CARBON MARKETS THROUGH NEW MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS  5 
 
actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing countries, which 
is guided by decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 80, and which, subject to conditions to be elaborated, 
may assist developed countries to meet part of their mitigation targets or commitments under 
the Convention.
4 
This decision seems to highlight a number of elements, i.e. a mechanism 
  operating under the authority of the COP; 
  promoting cost effectiveness; 
  and as guided by paragraph 80 of decision 1/CP.16,  
  ensuring the voluntary participation of Parties, supported by the promotion of fair and 
equitable access for all Parties; 
  complementing  other  means  of  support  for  nationally  appropriate  mitigation  actions 
(NAMAs) by developing country Parties; 
  stimulating mitigation across broad segments of the economy; 
  safeguarding environmental integrity; 
  ensuring a net decrease or avoidance of global GHG emissions; 
  assisting developed country Parties to meet part of their mitigation targets, while ensuring 
that the use of such a mechanism or mechanisms is supplemental to domestic mitigation 
efforts; 
  ensuring good governance and robust market functioning and regulation; and 
  able to assist developed countries to meet mitigation targets subject to some conditions. 
In the submissions, it is generally accepted, but by no means a consensus, that the NMM could have 
some of the following features:  
  The NMM could be sectoral in nature. 
  Some submissions refer, as a default, to sectoral crediting, and discuss to a much lesser degree 
sectoral trading.  
  Sectoral  crediting  could  be  used  to  issue  credits,  ex  post,  after  mitigation  actions  were 
undertaken, if emissions for the sector covered are under a crediting threshold, which itself is 
anticipated to be lower than the business-as-usual (BAU) baseline. The number of credits issued 
will represent the difference between the crediting threshold and actual emissions at the end of 
the period. 
  Sectoral trading could be used to issue allowances to installations in the covered sector. Any 
excess of allowances residual relative to the actual emissions of the sector are surplus, and can 
be sold on the market. If there is a shortage at the end of the compliance period, the installation 
must make up the shortfall by buying permits on the market. While in this case there is an ex-
ante distribution of allowances, which can be monetised to finance mitigation actions, what is 
actually true is that there is also an emissions target/ceiling accepted by the sector, which needs 
to be respected. 
  The NMM is to be operated under the authority of the COP or a designated regulatory body, and 
will  be  defined  and  designed  through  a  COP  process.  In  that  way,  it  can  be  viewed,  as  a 
simplification, that it has strong elements of a top-down mechanism. That does not need to 
imply rigidity, however, or lack of adaptability to local conditions. 
  The NMM is to have top-down rules and bottom-up implementation (the 80/20 rule). The NMM 
will be defined through a set of rules/standards. The rules/standards that ensure environmental 
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integrity will be defined at the global level. Yet there will be some level of flexibility, allowing 
for implementation/definition at the national level, to reflect local circumstances. The rationale 
for this is related to ensuring 
  environmental integrity; 
  that any variations at the local level in defining the NMM would not result in breaking 
the fundamental principle that ‘a tonne is a tonne’; and 
  market fungibility for the units produced for the NMM and market liquidity. 
  A process of compliance with the rules/standards is to be established. 
  A process to review and revise the rules/standards is also to be set up. 
  The NMM is to achieve net emission reductions. 
One might conclude, given the points above, that we are in effect dealing not with one mechanism, but 
at a minimum with two relatively distinct mechanisms –sectoral crediting and sectoral trading. While 
they share in common sectoral coverage, they are very different in many fundamental ways (e.g. the 
timing of permit issuance, where the obligation for compliance lies). 
In turn, both of them, by allowing standards/rules to be implemented at the local level according to 
national circumstances, create further branches. These further branches could present characteristics 
that would make each of them as distinct as sectoral crediting and sectoral trading are from one 
another.  
We could therefore more accurately say that the NMM, by defining the global rules/standards and 
allowing  national  implementation,  in  effect  defines  a  set  of  mechanisms  or  possibly  a 
framework/structure/outline (for lack of better words) for market mechanisms.  
The  opportunity  for  overlap  (and  confusion),  as  a  concept,  with  the  “Framework  for  Various 
Approaches”, as defined in the Durban AWG LCA text, emerges. Hence, in our view, this will be one 
of the issues that should be clarified on the road to Doha, starting with the May UNFCCC negotiating 
sessions in Bonn. 
That case is actually made in a number of submissions, which refer to the need for the NMM to allow 
for the definition of other mechanisms beyond the anticipated sectoral trading and sectoral crediting. 
The COP mandate outlined in the AWG LCA Durban text calls for the development of modalities and 
procedures for the NMM. In the submissions reviewed so far, and through the work done at CEPS, at 
this time we can distinguish different views on a number of issues, including the following ones (not 
an exhaustive list): 
  the requirements for Party participation; 
  who can participate (Parties, public and private entities, etc.); 
  the approaches covered by the NMM; 
  sector coverage; 
  boundaries; 
  methods to determine baselines; 
  the determination of crediting thresholds; 
  the length of the crediting/trading period; 
  the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) requirements; 
  provisions for the issuance and tracking of units; 
  the avoidance of double counting for reductions and finance flows, including coordination with 
existing project-based mechanisms; EXPANDING CARBON MARKETS THROUGH NEW MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS  7 
 
  institutional arrangements, including oversight issues; 
  the allocation of reductions between developed and developing countries; 
  the rules for permanency; 
  share of proceeds; 
  rules for supplementarity and the setting of numerical targets; 
  the recognition of early action; 
  the treatment of small island developing states (SIDS), least developed countries (LDCs) and 
vulnerable African countries; 
  the transmission of price signals from the aggregate to the individual level; 
  issues of sustainability; and 
  technology neutrality. 
We outline some of the positions and options presented in the submissions, and also those discussed 
within the CEPS CMF Task Force on New Market Mechanisms. This is done for some of the issues 
listed above, but not all. It should be recalled that this is not intended as a summary, but a synthesis, 
and as such not all views may be represented. Also, some of the issues listed above are to some degree 
self-explanatory.  
Participation 
On  the  issue  of  participation  requirements,  points  have  been  made  in  the  submissions  on  the 
participation of developed and developing countries.  
Among those expressed were these views: 
  Any and all Parties can use the NMM under the Convention, or 
  any and all Parties can participate, but some conditions need to be met to make use of the 
NMM. This is in some ways not dissimilar to the current use of mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol. For developing countries, some of the conditions being outlined would include 
  appointing a competent authority; 
  setting up a system for MRV in the sector(s) covered; 
  developing a registry; 
  estimating the baseline, and being able to demonstrate that it is significantly under the 
BAU baseline, through a technical review; 
  having in place a system to guard against double counting; and 
  being able to define these elements in an ex-ante report, and being able to defend the 
implementation annually, in an ex-post report. 
The concept of facilitated participation is also raised, for Parties to have access to the NMM, which 
brings us back to concepts similar to the compliance regime under the Kyoto Protocol. 
According to some submissions, to have access to the NMM developed countries should also have to 
meet some conditions, such as 
  having emission reductions targets/commitments that are legally binding at the international 
level, in the form of a single number and economy-wide; and 
  having in place a national system for estimating emissions. 
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Coverage 
Different submissions have made points regarding the range of installations that would be covered 
under the NMM. This refers primarily to what should constitute a priority for coverage, as well as any 
conditions that should be met, such as 
  the  use  of  IPCC  (Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change)  inventory  guidelines  and 
justification for any deviation; 
  the size of the facilities to be covered in a sector, to make it practical and material; 
  the GHG mitigation potential of sectors, sub-sectors or groups of installations; 
  the  suitability  of  certain  sectors  for  market  instruments,  including  data  availability  and 
responsiveness to price signals (as well as lack of suitability of certain sectors for the NMM); 
and 
  the opportunity to create financial incentives supported by the NMM. 
Also, it has been pointed out that it would make sense to start with sectors that would be less complex, 
and which would be useful to provide proof of the concept.  
Boundaries 
The views on this issue revolve around whether the whole sector has to be covered or possibly only a 
sub-set, or a number of installations. Cross-sector interactions should also be considered as well as the 
risk of leakage. 
Baseline determination 
This  matter  is  clearly  critical  and  is  viewed  as  something  that  will  require  review  at  the  global 
regulatory level. It should not be a simple extrapolation of historical data, but account for existing 
policies and measures, while for new installations one suggestion is the average of the top 10%. 
In addition, and to the largest extent possible, the same methodology should be used for the same 
sectors, as general guidance. The methodology for baseline determination should address as main 
principles, accuracy, completeness, reliability, sensitivity, materiality, conservativeness and context. 
Determination of the crediting threshold  
This discussion overlaps with that on net emission reductions, in that the crediting threshold should be 
well below the baseline discussed above.  
Factors to be considered in setting the crediting threshold include the capabilities of the sector in that 
country and the long-term policy perspective. The crediting threshold can be given in absolute or 
relative terms. 
The approaches mentioned are based on historical data and trends (which seem not to draw much 
support) and a specific technology or modelling approach. 
One issue raised is that of creating perverse incentives (e.g. creating an incentive to postpone policies). 
Crediting periods 
Crediting periods could be shorter at the beginning and then lengthened as we gain experience with 
the NMM. During this period, the crediting threshold should be fixed but have the capability to be 
reviewed and modified after each period. 
MRV requirements 
MRV is seen as a critical international standard for environmental integrity and ensuring that ‘a tonne 
is a tonne’. MRV provisions should include national arrangements covering 
  the responsibility for MRV and data storage; EXPANDING CARBON MARKETS THROUGH NEW MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS  9 
 
  provisions for transparency; 
  provisions on data source quality, default factor use and conservativeness; 
  independent verification; and 
  the accreditation of verifiers. 
One approach to be considered is the proposal to use procedures that are similar to those used for 
GHG inventories and national communications. In some cases, use of the IPCC’s tiered approach 
could also be explored. 
Issuance and tracking of units 
Permits/units should be issued in a national or international registry and the international transaction 
log (ITL), as an important element of the existing infrastructure that will be critical to avoid double 
counting. Issuance will only take place once there is compliance with international obligations, as 
discussed above. 
One solution being proposed is the introduction of unit accounting under the Convention and the 
introduction of a common unit to underpin the entire NMM. While interesting, this matter will be the 
subject of discussions and negotiations beyond the scope of the NMM.  
Avoidance of double counting 
Double counting should address the double counting of GHG reductions and finance. Avoidance of 
double counting can be addressed through the use of the ITL, correct tracking and accounting. 
In this context, concerns have been aired with respect to existing CDM projects in sectors covered by 
the NMM. A number of views have been expressed.  
Since investment in CDM projects has taken place, it is felt that those projects should be excluded 
from the sectoral coverage and allowed to continue under the CDM regime and to issue credits. 
Institutional arrangements 
Institutional arrangements can be discussed at a number of levels. At the national level there has to be 
a  designated  national  authority,  as  there  is  now  under  the  CDM,  with  expanded  capabilities  and 
responsibilities,  responsible  for  MRV,  possibly  setting  up  and  managing  the  registry,  submitting 
annual reports for compliance with conditions for participation in mechanisms, etc. 
At the international level there must be a regulator, under the authority of the COP, which could have 
review teams, as well as a body that considers questions of implementation.  
Also, as international institutional arrangements, the bodies mentioned could be set up under the COP 
directly or they could be part of an ‘NMM International Regulatory Body’, similar to the existing 
CDM Executive Board.  
The relationship between such a body and the current Executive Board is something that would need 
to be explored, but consideration should be given to having one regulatory body that deals with new 
and existing mechanisms. 
Recognition of early action 
It is critical that the effort starts as early as possible to operationalise and implement the NMM. As 
such, ways to recognise early action and attribute it value constitute a matter of great importance, and 
one that was raised in submissions and discussions.  
One way to incentivise early action is through pilot projects, which could be given recognition through 
value for compliance or through other means.  
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Sustainability 
Implementation of the CDM has had, as one of its key provisions, that the definition of sustainable 
development and approval of projects with respect to this matter would be the prerogative of the host 
country.  
This provision has led to substantial debate triggered by the kinds of projects that some countries had 
elected to approve and by the fact that in some cases there did not seem to be an elaborate set of 
sustainable  development  criteria  to  which  countries  could  point.  Furthermore,  an  aspect  that  has 
recently  become  a  hot  topic  is  that  there  is  no  provision  to  recall  an  approved  project  if  it  is 
subsequently  found  not  to  meet  the  sustainable  development  provisions  in  the  initial  documents 
submitted and approved by the designated national authority. 
As such, in both the CDM and the NMM, there is a strong push to develop international guidelines on 
sustainable development. Depending on how they are crafted, this may be a significant and important 
departure  from  current  provisions  ensuring  the  total  prerogative  of  host  countries  to  decide  for 
themselves what represents sustainable development. The ramifications could be significant and far-
reaching. 
Transmission of the price signal from the aggregate to the individual level 
This matter is closely related to the issue of private sector participation. In their submissions, some 
Parties and observer organisations expressed concerns regarding the way the private sector, as an 
investor needed to help fund the target of $100 billion a year, as well as individual installations that 
would be covered by a sectoral mechanism, will be incentivised, considering that the targets will be at 
the aggregate level. 
There are concerns that the actions of those that will take action and reduce emissions will be negated 
by others that do not, resulting in an overall failure and no compensation. 
This issue can be more easily addressed in sectoral trading, where individual installations would have 
their own obligations, than it can be in sectoral crediting, where there is only an aggregate number.  
In the case of sectoral trading, the overall obligation, should it not be met, would need to be met by 
some entity, possible the Party or individual installations in proportion to their failure to meet the 
objectives. 
One option that was discussed was government action for collecting credit revenue and deploying it in 
the form of financing for domestic policies. This may not be an attractive alternative to private sector 
participants. 
For  cases  of  non-compliance,  insurance  schemes  were  presented  as  possible  solutions,  including 
interventions by  international  multilateral  organisations,  as  well  as  other instruments,  such as the 
Green Climate Fund. 
The design of the NMM should account for ‘contractual’-like terms that will alleviate risks. With the 
CDM, the certified emission reductions are transferred by the UNFCCC to the account specified – and 
the CDM Modalities of Communication provide a lot of comfort to investors. Something similar needs 
to be provided in the NMM context. 
4.2  Issues related to the framework 
If the NMM agreed in Durban was defined under  paragraph 80 of 1/CP.16 and paragraph 83 of 
2/CP.17 (Durban), then paragraph 80 of 2/CP.17, which refers to the framework, does not provide 
much detail. This resonates in the many views and options that are included in the submissions, as 
well as in the discussions of the CEPS CMF Task Force on New Market Mechanisms. 
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What is the framework? 
The framework could be conceived as a set of rules/standards that would be used to define, present, 
document and potentially allow for UNFCCC recognition and approval of various approaches that are 
defined at the national/regional level. 
What is the role of the framework? 
This issue has been and continues to be among the critical ones, and will be the subject of difficult 
negotiations. Its resolution will spell out how carbon markets will evolve over the coming years, with 
potential implications for unit fungibility and market liquidity. 
It must be pointed out that any market-based mechanism or action under the UNFCCC, such as those 
arising under a framework, can only be relevant the moment units are used for international trading 
and are intended for use in compliance with UNFCCC obligations, in a jurisdiction other than that 
where 
  the unit of reduction has been produced (crediting), or 
  the units have been issued (trading). 
There are broadly two views being put forward in the submissions (as was the case in Durban), with a 
few attempts to provide a bridging solution: 
  The framework should be a structure for ‘mechanism  approval’ under the UNFCCC, and 
allow systems built outside the UNFCCC to gain UNFCCC recognition, and the units that are 
produced to be acceptable for UNFCCC compliance obligations. This is  a significant move 
away from the current system, which under the CDM approves reduction units, individually. In 
this case what is contemplated is the approval of new mechanisms by the regulator, which will 
then produce units and be operated at the national level, without further operational approval for 
unit  issuance  internationally.  Those  units  would  automatically  become  good  for  UNFCCC 
compliance.  It  would  focus  on  criteria  for  approval  that  ensure  high  standards  and 
environmental  integrity.  This  system  can  be  characterised  as  ‘strong  compliance,  strong 
centralisation’ and would satisfy those who feel that only units resulting from mechanisms that 
are under UNFCCC oversight can be used for UNFCCC compliance. The main objections to 
this approach come from those who do not wish to have their systems subjected to international 
approval  and  oversight,  given  their  experience  with  the  existing  project  mechanisms.  This 
approach may be laborious to put into place, as it would require the negotiation of standards 
used by the regulator for approval, as well as the establishment of a centralised regulator under 
the UNFCCC or some other designated institution. 
  The framework should provide for ‘mechanism transparency and reporting’. In this scenario, 
the framework would provide general principles for transparency, by specifying a level and 
format for reporting, and by ensuring that information is available in a coherent and consistent 
manner in the public domain, such that users and stakeholders can evaluate the mechanisms 
being used. Supporters of this approach view those governments that use credits as ultimately 
responsible for ensuring that they meet credible standards. In this scenario, various systems for 
reporting  the  kinds  of  credits  and  associate  standards  could  include  reporting  under  the 
International Assessment and Review, and International Consultations and Analysis. Also, in 
such a scenario, Parties could provide 
  detailed information on the standards and methodologies employed; 
  the categories, types and amounts of international credits transferred to and from another 
Party; 
  for analysis of the information provided by Parties, and as second step, the opportunity to 
request additional information, clarifications, etc. under a body such as the Subsidiary 
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This system would not provide any test for environmental quality or a system of redress, 
should there be concerns about the integrity of units produced and used for compliance. A 
number of issues were identified as having the potential to cause problems under such an 
approach, including scope and technology resulting in choices that would not be acceptable 
under international supervision. The advantage of this approach is that it can be put in place 
rapidly, but at the same time it could lead to market fragmentation. 
  A  ‘third  way’  has  been  proposed,  which  would  ensure  that the  role  of  the  framework  is 
initially more of a standard-setter, but would naturally evolve into an oversight instrument. 
We  conclude  that  both  approaches  favour  in  principle  setting  strong,  environmentally  demanding 
standards.  What  differentiates  them  is  that  one  approach  sees  a  greater  need  for  a  regulator  to 
intervene, test the systems used and have powers of redress if the systems are found wanting. 
What is a standard? 
Depending on what the role of the framework is (as discussed above), the standards described in the 
Durban AWG LCA text can be interpreted in a number of ways: 
  In  the  mechanism  approval  scenario,  they  are  criteria  for  approval  of the  mechanisms  that 
ensure high standards, that ‘a tonne is a tonne’ and that environmental integrity is preserved. 
They are seen, in this case, as internationally set and applying to all mechanisms regardless of 
the jurisdiction from which they emerge. We refer to three broad areas that are provided as 
examples 
  project activity/eligibility criteria, 
  methodology principles, and 
  monitoring standards. 
  In the second case, standards are used as templates and models for information disclosure for 
the mechanisms developed and used. In this case, there may not be a sole standard, but rather 
numerous standards, with each jurisdiction being free to develop (potentially) its own standard. 
The benefit derived from these standards, which could vary from one jurisdiction to another, is 
that the standards would be made public through the UNFCCC and therefore provide a level of 
transparency. 
NMM standards will be developed at the global and local levels. One could envisage generally that the 
NMM standards/rules defined globally would be done so in greater detail, and those done locally 
would represent an implementation level of detail, largely following the direction set globally.  
In the case of the framework, the level of detail may be lower at the global level, with more detail 
emerging locally, as the mechanisms evolve within national and regional jurisdictions.  
In the scenario of the framework as a standard setter and transparency provider, standards that would 
be developed locally for the framework, under general guidance globally, could include 
  an overview of the mechanism (process flow, institutions involved, etc.); 
  the underlying principles of methodologies and approval processes; 
  the roles related to third-party verification; and 
  approaches to managing projects and credits. 
In the case of the framework as a mechanism approval process, we can expect the framework standard 
(globally defined) to be more demanding and detailed, and to ensure more consistency among the 
different market approaches being approved under the framework. 
One question that begs to be answered is the relationship between the standards/rules of the NMM, the 
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units that can be used for compliance in the first instance in the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Later, the same will likely be true for the new climate regime being negotiated.  
Given this state of affairs, the units resulting from all these mechanisms must be fungible – ‘a tonne 
must be a tonne’. It follows that the standards, rules (or whatever they are called) must largely be 
consistent between what emerges in the NMM and the framework.  
The NMM, while itself defined top-down by the COP, should be able to qualify under the standards of 
the framework. Although not directly mentioned in the Durban text, the fungibility of units and the 
need for environmental integrity would lead us to such a conclusion. This was also highlighted in at 
least  one  submission  and  may  have  implications  for  the  regulatory  governance  of  all  these 
mechanisms. 
All these issues will need to be clarified at the upcoming SBI session, if progress is to be made on the 
way to Doha. 
Double counting and tracking 
As was the case under the NMM, and discussed above, given a potential explosion of new market 
approaches there is concern about the environmental integrity of the international regime. Again, the 
solutions will revolve around the role that one sees for the framework. 
The ITL, as an existing infrastructure, can play different roles: 
  It could transfer units, but also do policy-related checks and verify whether the units come 
from mechanisms that have been stamped by the UNFCCC. 
  It could simply transfer units without performing any checks. 
  Or it could simply vanish and be replaced by bilateral links between national registries, 
which would provide limited transparency and assurance as to what is being transferred and 
whether there is any double counting. 
Can the framework create new market mechanisms? 
The Durban text seems to give a positive reply to this question. The framework is meant to allow 
mechanisms not developed by the UNFCCC process to become UNFCCC-recognised. How that is 
done may be a matter of dispute, with the potential roles for the framework outlined above in terms of 
oversight and approval, or simply by providing information and transparency. 
It is important, however, to be aware that some hold the view that the NMM will be the place to 
‘house’  all  market  mechanisms,  while  the  framework  will  play  a  role  in  defining  non-market 
approaches. 
Governance 
It is clear that the UN system is seen as playing a role in the governance of the framework, as do 
national and regional jurisdictions. Yet the balance between the two levels is largely the result of the 
role one sees for the framework. 
In the mechanism approval mode, the international level defines the standards, provides oversight and 
tests,  has  the  power  of  enforcement,  provides  recognition  and  licenses  to  operate  and  can  affect 
changes in the standards.  
National and regional governments develop and propose mechanisms and systems, and operate them 
once they are approved. Still, they must report and remain in compliance to continue having a license 
to operate. 
In the transparency model, the national level defines standards, operates systems and reports on their 
characteristics and results. The international level provides guidelines, templates, best practices and 
coordinates disclosure, but does not have any oversight role. 14 | ANDREI MARCU 
In both cases the international level is seen as playing a useful part in tracking units, with or without a 
policy-testing role, before undertaking a transfer. 
How to address the concerns of LDCs, SIDS & African countries 
There is a general concern that the characteristics of the framework do not account for the needs and 
priorities of this group of Parties. This concern is expressed in strong terms in a few submissions, but 
there are no clear proposals on what is needed to address it.  
A share of the proceeds – a deduction of 2% of the certified emission reductions generated by CDM 
projects and used to fund adaptation measures in developing countries – is mentioned, together with 
ensuring preferred market access for projects from LDCs and so forth, as well as the need to ensure 
up-front financing.  
Building some of these provisions into the framework seems fairly straightforward. Nevertheless, it is 
unclear if some of the general positions on the share of proceeds, such as collecting on trading and 
the transfer  of  units,  not  only  of issuance (as is now the case under the Kyoto Protocol offset 
mechanisms), still constitute a fundamental position for some of the groups that introduced these 
proposals pre-Durban. 
Others would require prescriptive outcomes for the instruments that will emerge bottom-up, and may 
detract from the entrepreneurial spirit that is hoped to prevail. Much more thought and discussion is 
needed on this topic. 
4.3  Clarification of terminology 
It is not uncommon that decisions need to be digested before a common understanding is reached on 
what has been approved at the COP, in what is invariably, a compromise text. 
There  are  two  issues  that  have  emerged  from  the  submissions,  however,  as  well  in  the  course 
discussions over  the  last few  months,  that  merit  a brief  discussion:  net  emissions  reductions  and 
UNFCCC mechanisms. 
‘Net emissions reductions’ is a term mentioned in the Cancun text, as well as in the Durban decision. 
In mostly refers to ensuring that we go beyond the offsetting model that was applied by the existing 
mechanisms, the CDM and JI. 
One point being made is that offsetting, in principle, may refer to the use of the reduction, and whether 
some or all of the reduction is being traded and used for compliance or will simply be retired for 
environmental purposes. In this case, some proposals mention setting aside a fixed percentage of 
credits or allowances, where the percentage is decided ex ante and never used for compliance. 
Another way to describe net reductions is through the use of a crediting threshold that is under the 
BAU baseline (in addition to defining a conservative baseline). Ways of achieving this can vary, but a 
number  of  approaches  have  been  proposed,  including  setting  a  crediting  threshold  at  a  fixed 
percentage under the baseline or alternatively at a level that is negotiated on a more political and 
individual basis. 
Whatever option is chosen, and in the end this may be a local choice rather than a global rule, it needs 
to respect the view that offsets are no longer acceptable as an instrument and we need to go beyond 
them.  
One issue that will need to be confronted is that of the existing mechanisms that will continue to 
produce and co-exist with the NMM and the framework, and are an offset. 
Choosing a crediting threshold that is below BAU implies a certain level of comfort that we have the 
correct BAU, and that we can subtract from it. Given the current experience and the uncertainties 
around defining and accepting a baseline as valid, one factor that may also need to be considered is the 
simplicity of maintaining consistency with baseline methodologies under the CDM and JI. EXPANDING CARBON MARKETS THROUGH NEW MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS  15 
 
As  a  second  issue,  the  terms  ‘UNFCCC  mechanisms’  and  ‘mechanism  developed  outside  the 
UNFCCC framework’ are used, but their meaning is not always clear, and that could make a big 
difference. 
A UNFCCC mechanism can refer to a mechanism developed through the UNFCCC process, such as 
the CDM, or the NMM mechanism as envisaged. 
An alternative definition could be any mechanism that was defined through the UNFCCC process or 
mechanisms that were defined at the national level and subsequently, through the framework, found to 
meet the standards of the framework and accepted/approved. In this case the units they produce can be 
used for compliance with UNFCCC obligations. 
‘Mechanisms developed outside the UNFCCC framework’ could include all mechanisms under the 
transparency/declaratory model. Alternatively, under the mechanism approval model there could be 
some that are approved through the framework standards and become UNFCCC mechanisms and 
some that are not. 
4.4  Architecture and context 
One of the key issues that needs to the understood is the relationship between the NMM and the 
framework. The concept of the framework was introduced by some Parties, in the 2011 submissions, 
as well as in Cancun and Durban, envisaged as a set of rules/standards through which any new market 
mechanism could be tested before it could be accepted by the UNFCCC as meeting standards to 
deliver UNFCCC compliance-grade reductions.  
This  vision  included  top-down  mechanisms  (developed  in  the  UNFCCC  process,  e.g.  sectoral 
mechanisms) as well as bottom-up mechanisms (developed at the national level and submitted for 
approval to the UNFCCC). 
Non-market  approaches  were  regarded  as  being  quite  different  in  nature,  requiring  their  own 
framework. 
We now have the Durban text. The Durban outcome has created the possibility of an NMM that could 
be construed as providing a framework for the development and deployment of a set of mechanisms, 
mostly sectoral in nature, but not necessarily only sectoral. At the same time, the AWG LCA Durban 
text proposes a framework that will consider, in some way, market mechanisms that emerge bottom-
up,  from  the  country  level.  All  these  mechanisms  must  be  fungible,  however,  and  as  such  the 
frameworks are condemned to be compatible.  
One issue that deserves discussion is whether, under a ‘project approval’ model for the framework, we 
really need two frameworks – the NMM one and the framework itself. 
Another important architectural issue is the relationship between the existing mechanisms, and the 
NMM and the framework. It is emphasised above that they have to be compatible and fungible.  
Another issue that will need to be addressed is the potential conflict with and double counting in 
relation to existing projects under the CDM, where the same activities are captured under the sectors 
of the NMM or potentially other market approaches under the framework.  
Some  submissions  simply  refer  to  ensuring  complementarity  and  transparency.  Yet  this  is  an 
important matter considering that all these instruments could potentially have to co-exist in the same 
country, and maybe within the same sector. 
The danger of double counting is real and needs to be addressed for new and existing projects. For 
existing  projects,  project  participants  have  already  made  investments  and  expect  the  issuance  of 
certified emission reductions. Changing the rules will further weaken confidence in a market that is 
already suffering from a lack of confidence in the regulatory and political process underpinning it. As 
such, issuance should continue, but the reductions should be factored into the BAU baseline. 
In sectors covered by the NMM, one approach is not to register new projects, as in this case the 
baseline would require adjustment. 16 | ANDREI MARCU 
Also, the new market approaches will certainly intersect with NAMAs, which can be divided into 
NAMAs that are  
  unilateral, where a developing country takes autonomous action to reduce emissions; 
  supported, where actions to reduce emissions by a developing country are conditioned upon 
international support; and 
  credit generating, where developing countries earn credits that can be sold internationally. 
Given the importance of NAMAs in the new architecture, the concerns that will need to be addressed 
include the double counting of emission reductions, the double counting of financial support and the 
possibility that developing countries could sell the low-hanging fruit and end up retaining only the 
high-cost abatement reductions for their own use.  
A special concern expressed in this area is the intersection of market mechanisms with supported and 
credited NAMAs (where the NMM could be seen as a crediting tool for NAMAs). 
Finally, the NMM, CDM/JI and the framework (under any of the models discussed) will need a body 
to play a regulatory role, more or less intense and active. 
The existing infrastructure is currently in place for CDM/JI and one option that should be explored is 
having all market mechanisms under one regulatory body, which can bring coherence to all of them 
and build on the experience of the last decade. 
4.5  Role of the UNFCCC 
The role of the UNFCCC in the NMM and framework has been discussed in various sections of this 
report. So far, the UNFCCC has played a unique role in the UN system as a market regulator, and the 
outcome has met mixed reviews. 
On one hand it has ensured credibility and impartiality for a system of offsets that will always be 
subject to criticism. In that way it must recognised that the UNFCCC has provided a very valuable 
contribution. Also, over the years its efficiency and efficacy have notably increased. On the other hand 
it is governed by UN rules, which can be seen as rigid and not suitable for a global regulator. 
It is clear that for the NMM, the UNFCCC is seen as the oversight body and the regulator. Whether it 
is through the COP itself, the SBI or functioning in ways similar to the current compliance regime, this 
is a role that is generally accepted for the NMM. 
In the case of the framework, it is seen in different lights, depending on the role of the framework 
itself.  As  such,  the  UNFCCC  could  be  seen  as  having  oversight  responsibility  as  a  regulator. 
Alternatively, it may be called to play a part only in coordination and standard publicising.  
4.6  Participation of the private sector 
Market mechanisms play a role in efficiently reducing emissions and helping to direct private finance 
to reach the $100 billion target agreed in Cancun.  
In the CDM and JI, the private sector is clear on the risk it takes, the return and how the incentives 
reach the point of investment. Returns are guaranteed, as the governance ensures that reductions will 
be issued to the account agreed contractually when the UN system issues them. In this way the UN 
system plays an important role. 
The relationship of the private sector with national governments in the case of the CDM is limited to a 
Letter of Approval; once it is issued, there is no process for repealing the approval. Under the NMM, 
and possibly the approaches under the framework, the relationship between business and governments 
will change substantially.  
Given the fact that the NMM requires sectors or sub-sectors to be organised, it will likely require 
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In addition, the fact that reductions are aggregated, but investments may take place at the installation 
or  project  level,  will  also  change  the  nature  of  the  participation  and  risk  profile  for  business 
participants. 
It is difficult for many private sector players to imagine the incentive in a sectoral scheme, especially 
of a crediting nature, and governments have not produced convincing arguments so far. 
Simply put, some participants may contribute towards the target set while others may not. How to 
differentiate and reward those that take action is difficult to see, while at the same time ensure that we 
do not return to a project-based form of measurement. 
From that point of view, a sectoral trading approach has appeal, as it is easier to see how the incentive 
will reach and reward those that have to take action. Still, issues of liquidity and in-country capacity 
should not be neglected.  
5.  Issues to look out for 
In our view, coming to a resolution on the NMM and the framework in Doha will be, while not a 
sufficient, a necessary condition for progress and agreement at the next COP, as this is a critical issue 
for a significant number of Parties. 
The discussions since Durban, and the fact that in some cases the two submissions for the 5 March 
deadline to the UNFCCC are either identical or to some degree reflect ‘cut and paste’ similarities, 
indicates some lack of clarity in some of the fundamental concepts in the Durban text.  
It would be extremely useful if the upcoming workshops on these topics under the UNFCCC, as well 
as the upcoming sessions in general, could help clarify the vision of the different Parties or groups of 
Parties on these matters. 
While not going into further detail, some of the issues that would benefit from ‘air time’ at the May 
sessions could include 
•  the relationship between UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC mechanisms, and notably the question of 
what a UNFCCC mechanism is; 
•  the relationship between the standards for the NMM and the standards for various approaches 
(under the framework); 
•  views on what constitutes a standard–i.e. a global standard (one) vs. national standards (many); 
•  the question of what units can be used for UNFCCC compliance, and specifically whether units 
from mechanisms emerging under the “Framework for Various Approaches” can be used; 
•  centralisation to ensure environmental integrity and the role of the framework; 
•  net emission reductions and a common understanding of the concept; and 
•  the needs of LDCs, SIDS and African countries. 
To conclude, what the submissions and discussions post-Durban show is strong support for the 
appropriate use of markets, under robust regulation and oversight, to ensure that they deliver 
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List of abbreviations  
AWG KP  Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol 
AWG LCA  Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
BAU  Business as usual 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism (under Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
CMF  Carbon Market Forum (at CEPS) 
COP  Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change  
GHG  Greenhouse gas (the six gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol – CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs and SF6)  
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
ITL  International transaction log  
JI   Joint implementation (under Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
LDCs  Least developed countries 
MRV  Measurement, reporting and verification 
NAMA  Nationally appropriate mitigation action 
NMM  New market mechanism 
SBI  Subsidiary Body for Implementation  
SIDS  Small island developing states 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 